We present a technique for checking aggregation abstractions automatically using a nite-state enumerator. The abstraction relation between implementation and speci cation is checked on-the-y and the veri cation requires examining no more states than checking a simple invariant property. This technique can be used alone for veri cation of nite-state protocols, or as preparation for a more general aggregation proof using a general-purpose theorem-prover. We illustrate the technique on the cache coherence protocol in the Flash multiprocessor system.
INTRODUCTION
Formal veri cation of a system design compares two di erent descriptions of the system: the speci cation describes the desired behavior, and the implementation describes the actual behavior of the system. The implementation is usually given in some (potentially) executable form. There are many specication methods, such as assertions in the implementation code, temporal logic or the other logical properties, or automata. However, the most appropriate speci cation for a protocol is often an abstract version of the protocol with coarser-grained atomicity. For example, most cache coherence protocols are intended to simulate atomic memory operations using non-atomic sequences of steps which execute in a distributed environment. Veri cation of such a protocol ultimately requires comparing the implementation protocol with the speci cation protocol with respect to some consistency criterion.
Previously, we developed a proof methodology called \aggregation" for relating a protocol to its abstract version by providing an abstraction function Introduction 3 ing a simulation relation automatically, this may be an appropriate tradeo when the state explosion problem obstructs a more automatic proof.
The method is compatible with theorem proving because the same description of the speci cation protocol, the implementation protocol, and the aggregation function can be used for both automatic checking and theorem-proving of the aggregation abstraction. It allows the user to debug the implementation, speci cation, and aggregation functions quickly before invoking the theorem prover for proving the correctness of an unbounded implementation or innite family of implementations. The state enumerator can also be used to help debug invariants and check some lemmas on examples before trying to prove them formally. Obviously, the same general technique can be used with any program capable of enumerating the reachable states of a system description, including BDD-based model checkers 22] . Indeed, it may outperform other methods using abstraction in BDD-based model checkers, for some applications.
Background and related work
The use of abstraction functions and relations of various kinds (also called re nements 1, 19] , homomorphisms 16], and simulations 23]) to compare two descriptions is a fundamental veri cation technique that can be applied to many di erent problems and representations in many di erent ways (e.g. 21, 18, 6] ). Since the details of these methods vary greatly, it is di cult to nd a simple general principle underlying them all. However, at a very high level, many of them can be seen to involve proving a property something like (as shown in Figure 1 where Impl is a step of the implementation, Spec is a corresponding step of the speci cation, and R is a binary relation from an implementation domain to a speci cation domain.
One approach using nite-state methods is to prove that a simulation preorder holds between the implementation and speci cation state graphs. For simulation preorder checking, the user provides descriptions of the implementation and speci cation state graphs and an initial relation which must contain the desired simulation relation. (For example, the initial relation could require that whenever an implementation state is paired with a speci cation state, the two states have the same label.) Given this information, the existence of a simulation relation (and the most general relation) can be computed by iterative elimination of states that cannot satisfy property (1) .
Simulation preorder checking can be computed \on-the-y" if the state graphs are given implicitly as a set of rules or nite-state programs 4, 5, 15, 14] . Unfortunately, in the worst case, this computation is linear in the size of the product of the implementation and speci cation graphs. In both theory and practice, checking simulation preorder between implementation and speci cation graphs is much more expensive than our technique, which costs the same as checking a simple safety property on the implementation graph alone.
Simulation preorder checking can also be performed on graphs represented by BDDs by using a symbolic xed-point algorithm 7]. However, this requires dealing with relations containing Boolean variables of both the implementation and speci cation state graphs, so the cost of veri cation using this method is also much greater than that of checking a simple property on an implementation state graph alone.
Another approach using abstraction with BDDs is found in 20, 10, 9]. The method claims that a concrete program satis es a property speci ed with CTL formulas if the abstracted program satis es the corresponding property by an abstraction relation. To apply this method, the user must nd an abstraction relation that preserves the property given in CTL formulas. There are two problems with this method from our perspective. First, we are interested in using a protocol as the speci cation. It is di cult or impossible to specify a protocol completely using CTL. Second, this method uses BDDs or some similar symbolic representation. Yet, we have found that explicit state enumeration greatly outperforms straightforward BDD-based veri cation for some classes of descriptions 13], such as all those described below.
A direct approach would appear to checking inclusion of the language of anite automaton describing implementation behavior in the language of another automaton describing speci cation behavior, possibly using an on-the-y algorithm. If the speci cation automaton is nondeterministic, this operation is generally exponential in the size of the speci cation automaton (some individuals have nessed this problem by requiring the speci cation automaton to be presented in a complemented form 16]). If the speci cation automaton
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Recently, there has been proposed an approach to using a model checker for comparing a speci cation protocol and an implementation protocol 11]. However, the technique uses a model checker simply to run the two protocols in parallel without de ning a precise abstraction relation between the two protocols. Moreover, the size of each state checked by the technique is increased by that of a speci cation protocol.
THE AGGREGATION ABSTRACTION
This section describes the aggregation method in general. The veri cation method begins with logical descriptions of state graphs of the implementation and the speci cation. The implementation description contains a set of state variables; the set Q of states of the implementation is the set of assignments of values to the state variables. The speci cation description may contain a subset of the state variables of the implementation. Each description also speci es a transition relation between a state and its possible successors represented by a set of functions. An implementation step Impl i maps a given implementation state to its next state. Similarly, a speci cation step Spec i maps a given speci cation state to its next state. The speci cation contains idle transitions which map a state to itself.
The aggregation abstraction works when the computation can be thought of as implementing a set of transactions and each transaction has an identiable commit step. Based on the reasoning about the commit steps, the user de nes an aggregation function aggr which maps an implementation state to a speci cation state by rst completing any committed but incomplete transactions, then hiding variables that do not appear in the speci cation. The commit steps in the implementation correspond to atomic transactions in the speci cation, and the other steps in the implementation correspond to an idle transition in the speci cation. For each pair of corresponding implementation step and speci cation step (for convenience, we assumed Impl i corresponds to Spec i ), the aggregation function should satisfy the following commutativity requirement,
The number of proofs required is equal to the number of transition functions in the implementation. The requirements (2) will generally not hold for some absurd states that cannot actually occur during a computation. Hence, it is usually necessary to provide an invariant predicate, which characterizes a superset of all the 
In other words, aggr only needs to commute when q satis es the Inv. Use of an invariant incurs some additional proof obligations. First, we must nd a proper invariant that makes (3) satis ed, and second, we must prove that the invariant is true in the implementation description by showing that the invariant holds at initial states and each implementation step preserves the invariant. From our experience, nding and proving an inductive invariant is the most time consuming part of many veri cation problems. It is especially di cult to debug faulty invariants using only a theorem prover. One of the great advantages of nite-state veri cation methods is that they compute the required invariant (the reachable state space) automatically.
CHECKING AGGREGATION ABSTRACTIONS ON-THE-FLY
To check the aggregation abstraction automatically, we use a nite-state enumerator which explores all and only the reachable states of the implementation on-the-y. Because state enumeration generates the exact invariant of the system while searching the state space, the user can check property (2) above without proving property (3) .
Given a purported aggregation function and correspondence between implementation steps and speci cation steps, the requirements are expressed as a Boolean condition on the implementation state which consists of a set of conjuncts corresponding to each implementation step:
The aggregation abstraction holds if the Boolean condition is true on all the reachable states in the implementation. Therefore, the aggregation abstraction can be automatically checked using any nite-state enumerator which is able to check such propositional properties. Mur' has an automatic veri er which generates all of the reachable states of the described system. Execution of a Mur' program begins with one of a set of initial states of the graph. Then the following loop is executed forever: some rule whose condition is satis ed by the current state is chosen and its action evaluated, yielding a new current state. If there are no rules whose conditions are true, the execution halts. Although the action may be a compound statement consisting of a sequence of smaller statements, conditionals, and loops, it is executed atomically|no other rule can be executed before the action completes. When several rule conditions are true at the same time, a choice is made arbitrarily, resulting in several possible executions. The Mur' veri er tries them exhaustively by depth-rst or breadth-rst search.
Several types of errors can be detected while the veri er explores the state graph. An invariant which is a Boolean expression on the global state variables is checked in any reachable state. An assert statement, which is a Boolean condition speci ed in an action statement, can also be checked whenever the veri er gets to the speci ed point to execute the description. The system can detect deadlock states, which are states that have no other states as successors. If a problem of any type is detected, the veri er prints out a diagnostic trace, which is a sequence of states that leads to a state exhibiting the problem.
Checking aggregation abstractions using Mur'
Normally, a description of a single protocol implementation is speci ed in Mur', and simple properties such as invariants and in-line assertions are checked. For aggregation, we need also to include a speci cation protocol and an aggregation function. First, we embed all of the implementation state variables in a single record type; similarly, we embed the speci cation protocol state variables in a second record type. The aggregation function aggr is written as a function in Mur'. The speci cation steps are also written as functions, which take a speci cation state (record) as an argument and which return a modi ed speci cation state.
A straightforward way of checking the Boolean condition (4) is using an invariant of Mur'. We specify the propositional predicate (which may be a big Boolean expression) as a single invariant and then run the veri er to check it on every reachable state. Similarly, this can be done using other model checkers: e.g., a CTL model checker by specifying the same condition as an ag property.
However, the requirements can be checked more e ciently if we exploit the property that each requirement (2) for an implementation step matters only when the step is enabled and that not all the implementation steps are enabled from a state. Using in-line assert commands of Mur', each conjunct of the Boolean predicate can be checked separately on-the-y only when the corresponding step is enabled and generates a next state by executing its action statement. To this end, we add an assert statement to each rule of the implementation description as shown in the following (the original rule was of the form Rule CONDITION ==> Begin ACTION-STATEMENT; Endrule;):
Rule "Transition relation for Impl_i" CONDITION ==> Var i0, i1: ImplState; Begin i0 := current_state; ACTION-STATEMENT; i1 := current_state; Assert Spec_i(aggr(i0)) = aggr(i1); Endrule;
The two local variables i 0 and i 1 contain the implementation state before and after the execution of the rule respectively. The assert statement expresses the corresponding commutativity requirement using the functions de ned for speci cation steps and the aggregation function.
The Mur' veri er will automatically check the assertions on-the-y on all the reachable states while exploring the state space of the implementation description. Note that the speci cation steps are written as functions and called and computed in local variables inside the assert statements, while the implementation steps are written as statements which are executed to generate next states in the description. The speci cation state is not saved between rule executions|only the implementation contributes to the states. Therefore, the number of states explored by the veri er is still the same as that of the implementation description. Consequently, the amount of memory needed to check the abstraction is the same as that needed to check the reachable states of the implementation only. 
Informal description of the protocol
The system consists of a set of nodes, each of which contains a processor, caches, and a portion of global memory of the system. The distributed nodes communicate using asynchronous messages through a point-to-point network. The state of a cached copy is in either invalid, shared (readable), or exclusive (readable and writable). The cache coherence protocol is directory-based so that it can support a large number of distributed processing nodes. Each cache line-sized block in memory is associated with directory header which keeps information about the line. For a memory line, the node on which that piece of memory is physically located is called home; the other nodes are called remote. The home maintains all the information about memory lines in its main memory in the corresponding directory headers.
If a read miss occurs in a processor, the corresponding node sends out a get request to the home (this step is not necessary if the requesting processor is in the home). Receiving the get request, the home consults the directory corresponding to the memory line to decide what action the home should take. If the line is pending, meaning that another request is already being processed, the home sends a nak (negative acknowledgment) to the requesting node. If the directory indicates there is a dirty copy in a remote, then the home forwards the get to that node. Otherwise, the home grants the request by sending a put to the requesting node and updates the directory properly. When the requesting node receives a put reply, which returns the requested memory line, the processor sets its cache state to shared and proceeds to read.
For a write miss, the corresponding node sends out a getx request to the home. Receiving the getx request, the home consults the directory. If the line is pending, the home sends a nak to the requesting node. If the directory indicates there is a dirty copy in a third node, then the home forwards the getx to that node. If the directory indicates there are shared copies of the memory line in other nodes, the home sends invs (invalidations) to those nodes. Then the home grants the request by sending a putx to the requesting node . If there are no shared copies, the home simply sends a putx to the requesting node and updates the directory properly. When the requesting node receives a putx reply which returns an exclusive copy of the requested memory line, the processor sets its cache state to exclusive and proceeds to write. This is the case when the multiprocessor is running in Eager mode. In Delayed mode, this grant is deferred until all the invalidation acknowledgments are received by the home.
During the read miss transaction, an operation called sharing write-back is necessary in the following \three hop" case. This occurs when a remote processor in node R 1 needs a shared copy of a memory line an exclusive copy of which is in another remote node R 2 . When the get request from R 1 arrives at the home H, the home consults the directory to nd that the line is dirty in R 2 . Then H forwards the get to R 2 with the source of the message faked as R 1 instead of H. When R 2 receives the forwarded get, the processor sets its copy to shared state and issues a put to R 1 . Unfortunately, the directory in H does not have R 1 on its sharer list yet and the main memory does not have an updated copy when the cached line is in the shared state. The solution is for R 2 to issue a swb (sharing write-back) conveying the dirty data to H with the source faked as R 1 . When H receives this message, it writes the data back to main memory and puts R 1 on the sharer list.
When a remote receives an inv, it invalidates its copy and then sends an acknowledgment to the home. There is a subtle case with an invalidation. A processor which is waiting for a put reply may get an inv before it gets the shared copy of the memory line, which is to be invalidated if the put reply is delayed. In such a case, the requested line is marked as invalidated, and the put reply is ignored when it arrives.
A valid cache line may be replaced to accommodate other memory lines. A shared copy is replaced by issuing a replacement hint to the home, which removes the remote from its sharers list. An exclusive copy is written back to main memory by a wb (write-back) request to the home. Receiving the wb, the home updates the line in main memory and the directory properly.
The aggregation function
To de ne the aggregation function aggr, we rst identify commit steps of each transaction in the protocol. For a transaction processing a read miss (or a write miss), the commit step occurs when the home, or a remote with an exclusive copy, sends a put (or putx) reply, granting the request. A writeback transaction begins with invalidating an exclusive copy and sending a wb request to the home; and this is the commit step of the transaction because a part of the speci cation variables are already updated at this moment and the write-back request can not be denied by the home.
The aggregation function simulates completing all committed transactions in the current state. If there exists a put message destined to a node i, the transaction for a read miss in node i must be completed by simulating the e ect of node i processing the put message it receives at the end of the transaction: putting the data in the message into its cache and setting the state to shared. The transaction for a write miss is similarly completed by processing a putx message. There are two more kinds of messages possibly generated at commit steps and need to be processed to complete the committed transacExample: FLASH cache coherence protocol 11 tions: swb and wb to the home. Note that there exists at most one message of the four types destined to a particular node at any time. This processing changes values and states of cached copies, and values in main memory. Changes to implementation variables, such as removing messages from the network, and reseting the waiting ag in the processor can be omitted from the completion function, as they do not a ect the corresponding speci cation state.
The aggregation function processing all the messages as described can be easily written in Mur' using a \for-loop" indexed on the network queue. Figure 2 shows the de nition of the function. An implementation state is declared as a record consisting of an array PNet for network containing reply messages, an array QNet for network containing request messages, and an array Procs modeling processors with caches. Each message is also a record containing elds for its destination dst, source src, and data Data. From an implementation state ist, the function computes a speci cation state using a local variable sst to be returned. First, the speci cation variables of ist is copied into sst. Then, in the second for-loop, sst is modi ed by simulating to process each message in the network in the implementation state ist if it is one of such types that completes a committed transaction.
Checking the aggregation abstraction using Mur'
We illustrate the details on one of the implementation step (i.e., one of the requirements) of the protocol: a commit step of the transaction processing a write miss. Figure 3 shows the Mur' function for the speci cation step which corresponds to the transaction. As before, a speci cation state is declared as a record consisting of an array of cache states and data for each processor, and main memory. The function returns a speci cation state which is obtained by processing a write miss transaction atomically: if oldproc owns an exclusive copy, the exclusive data is transferred to processor newproc; otherwise if there is no exclusive copy in any processors, an exclusive copy is granted to processor newproc by copying the data in main memory to its cache.
To check the aggregation abstraction on-the-y, we make sure that the rules in Mur' description correspond exactly to the implementation steps Impl i of the protocol. Figure 4 presents the detailed rule for the implementation step where a remote node having an exclusive copy grants the ownership transfer by sending a putx reply to the requesting node. The guard condition of the rule checks if there is a getx request on the head of the request queue from src to dst (which is a remote) and the node dst contains an exclusive copy of the memory line. In the action statement, the processor in the node dst invalidates its own copy and sends out a putx reply to the requesting node.
Without changing the original description, we simply add a few lines of commands to check the commutativity requirement (additions to the original Figure 2 The aggregation function written in Mur' implementation description are marked with stars in the gure). First, local variables i 0 , i 1 , s 0 , and s 1 are declared to be used to copy the implementation states and speci cation states, respectively, before and after the execution of the rule. Because this implementation step is the commit step of a writemiss transaction, the corresponding speci cation step is \Atomic GetX" in Figure 3 . Using the declaration of the speci cation step and the aggregation function, the assert statement explicitly speci es the corresponding commutativity requirement. 
Experiments
By the aggregation abstraction, the protocol consisting of more than a hundred di erent implementation steps has been reduced to a speci cation with only six kinds of atomic transactions. It is much easier or trivial to prove important properties of the reduced model, such as the consistency of data at the user level, than the original protocol description.
To check the abstraction automatically, we have run Parallel Mur' on 32 Ultra Sparc processors 27] . For the protocol with 3 processing nodes and request/reply message queues of size 5, the veri er explored 457,558 states in 126 seconds; for 4 processing nodes and queues of size 3, about 19 million states in 72 minutes. As expected, the number of states explored (also the usage of memory) is exactly same as that found for exploring reachable state space of the implementation model.
CONCLUSION
By limiting the veri cation problems to nite-state systems, we proposed an e cient technique for checking aggregation abstractions without reasoning about invariants of the system. The veri cation requires checking only the same number of states as in the implementation model by exploiting the correspondence information provided by the user.
The technique can be used alone for veri cation of nite-state protocols, since abstract protocols are sometimes the best properties to check. The technique can also be applied before theorem proving of aggregation abstractions to debug a purported aggregation function in early stage.
The Flash protocol example has been veri ed before by applying aggregation abstraction using a general-purpose theorem-prover, which took two months 26]. However, the proof would have been much easier had we thought of this nite-state method before completing them. Use of the automatic checking can reveal any human errors in nding aggregation functions and speci cation models, and helps to debug them in early stage of proofs.
